Celotex said it had only limited interaction with designers and specifier in the refurbishment process. It sold products through third party builders merchants.
The company's position is that people working on the project did not spot the problems with design and materials choices. However, emails between people at these companies showed that they knew how flammable the outer covering was.
When it came to the insulation, key people seem to have assumed that Class 0 surface spread of fire is the same as limited flammability, Celotex said. It stressed that the two things are different.
Although some products were specified, it said the contractor 'appears to have selected the insulation to use to fill voids and gaps in the window surrounds without any guidance or instructions about ensuring compliance of such products'.
Celotex added that the first material specified to insulate the building was its FR 5000 product. This 'is not (and never was) marketed by Celotex for the over-18m market,' it said.
It added that FR5000's data sheet says it is suitable for pitched roofs, walls and floors, and not rainscreen cladding systems in buildings over 18m.
The company said that this RS5000 material was sold from August 2014, and passed the BS8414 large scale fire test.
Buildings over 18m high with the right rainscreen cladding were a target market, it said, but only when used with specific components listed in the marketing literature. 'Any changes to these components would need to be considered by the building designer,' it said.
Celotex also claimed that this cladding system 'bore no resemblance to the rainscreen cladding system used in the Grenfell Tower'.
The inquiry continues. You can follow the submissions here.
Grenfell: Official phase 1 report blames materials combinations
Grenfell: Metal-polyethylene cladding 'principle reason' for fire spread
Grenfell: Met Police continue criminal investigations, residents to sue in US
Grenfell: Consider the whole building system: PU Europe